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 Abstract 
This paper examines the effects of transitory skill mismatch in a matching model with 
heterogeneous jobs and workers. In our model, some high-educated workers may accept 
unskilled jobs for which they are over-qualified but are allowed to engage in on-the-job 
search in pursuit of a better job.  We show that this feature has relevant implications for the 
set of potential equilibria, the unemployment rates of the different types of workers, the 
degree of wage inequality, and the response of the labour market to shifts in the demand 
and supply of skills. 
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“An examination to select 175 postal workers for the region of Madrid yesterday gath-
ered 15,570 candidates. Among them, 53% were college graduates (“licenciados” or
"diplomados") while the required educational attainment was upper-secondary educa-
tion (“graduado escolar”) or an equivalent level of vocational training” (EL PAÍS,
23/03/2002).
1 Introduction
As the previous headline in a Spanish newspaper illustrates, mismatch between the skill
requirements of jobs and the educational attainments of workers can be a pervasive fea-
ture in some labour markets. In this paper, we study this phenomenon in a matching
model with heterogeneous jobs (skilled and unskilled) on one side and heterogeneous
workers (high- and less-educated) on the other side of the market. Since the matching
technology is imperfect, the high-educated workers may end up in unskilled jobs for
which they are over-qualified. A key element in our analysis is that mismatched work-
ers are allowed to keep the option of moving to better jobs through on-the-job search
(henceforth, OTJ search). Skill mismatch has therefore a transitory nature in our econ-
omy leading to job-to-job (hereafter, JTJ) transitions which are shown to have relevant
implications for the composition of jobs, unemployment, wages and the reaction of the
labour market to shifts in the demand and supply of skills.
Labour economists have long recognised the importance of JTJ flows, but it is
only recently that the literature on equilibrium unemployment has started to explore
its implications systematically.1 Our paper contributes to this stream of research by
providing an analytical framework in which to identify the channels through which
over-qualification and OTJ search affect labour market outcomes. In particular, given
long-standing concerns about the possibility that over-qualified workers may "crowd
out" low-educated workers from unskilled jobs (see, e.g., Freeman, 1976; OECD, 2001),
we pay specific attention to the effects of these phenomena on the less-skilled segment
of the labour market.
1Broadly speaking, the literature on OTJ search can be divided in two strands. One strand uses
models in the vein of Burdett and Mortensen (1998) to explain how OTJ search may give rise to
wage differentials among identical workers; see, e.g., Mortensen (2003) for an excellent overview of
this literature. The second strand incorporates OTJ search in the standard matching framework to
study its implications for the wage distribution, turnover and the cyclical dynamics of unemployment
and vacancies; see, e.g., Pissarides (1994), Shimer (2003; 2006), Moscarini (2003) and Nagypál (2003).
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The starting point of our analysis is the matching model proposed by Albrecht and
Vroman (2002) (henceforth, AV) who explore the consequences of skill mismatch in a
setup similar to ours but where OTJ search is precluded. Like AV, we assume that firms
have a choice between two types of jobs. The skilled jobs are more productive than
the unskilled jobs but they require a high-educated worker, while the unskilled jobs
can be performed equally well by all workers.2 In the absence of OTJ search, AV show
that there could be two types of equilibria: one in which high-educated workers match
with both types of jobs (a cross-skill matching equilibrium) and another in which they
refuse to take unskilled jobs (an ex-post segmentation equilibrium). The latter type is
more likely: (i) the larger is the gap between the productivity of skilled and unskilled
jobs and (ii) the higher is the share of high-educated workers in the population. Their
findings suggest that shifts in the skill distribution and in the relative productivity
of jobs may cause abrupt changes in unemployment rates and wages as the economy
moves between the two equilibria (see also Acemoglu, 1999).
Aside from creating a more realistic model, our main goal is to analyse how the
above predictions change when the option of OTJ search is taken into account. To
keep the model tractable, we assume that this search is a costless activity for the
workers. Nonetheless, the high-educated workers who meet an unskilled job may face
an opportunity cost, since the arrival rate of future job offers drops when the match is
accepted. In particular, we assume that the ratio between the arrival rates of offers to
employed and unemployed job seekers takes a value between 0 and 1. In this fashion,
our model nests both AV’s setup (a zero arrival rate for employed job seekers) and the
case in which all job seekers face equal contact rates. The remaining assumptions are
borrowed from AV, including a random matching technology and the assumption that
workers obtain a fixed share of the flow surplus of a match.3 This last assumption
implies that the pursuit of a better match is the only motive for OTJ search in our
economy, ruling out the possibility of wage differentials between identical workers on
the same type of jobs.
We obtain three main results that affect AV’s conclusions. Our first result shows
that the introduction of OTJ search reduces the scope for multiple equilibria since it
2For simplicity, workers’ skills are assumed to be perfectly correlated with their educational at-
taintments.
3For more details on the role of this assumption, see section 3.3.
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lowers the opportunity cost of mismatch for the high-educated workers. In fact, for a
sufficiently small gap in the above-mentioned arrival rates, there is a unique type of
equilibrium with cross-skill matching and OTJ search. This result rules out the drastic
response to demand and supply shifts that characterises skill-mismatch models without
OTJ search.
Our second result shows that transitory skill mismatch by over-qualified workers
is more harmful to the prospects of less-educated workers than permanent mismatch.
Here there are two channels at work. On the one hand, the introduction of OTJ
search stimulates the creation of skilled jobs since the assumption that mismatched
workers stay in the pool of job seekers facilitates filling these jobs. On the other
hand, the quits by over-qualified workers reduce the stability of unskilled jobs, lowering
the profitability of firms offering these jobs These effects result in a shift of the job
distribution towards skilled jobs which, in line with the empirical evidence, induces
both a fall in the job finding rate of the less-educated workers and a relatively high
separation rate for unskilled jobs.
Third, we show that OTJ search widens the wage differences among the high-
educated workers. As mentioned above, it reduces their opportunity cost of accepting
unskilled jobs but, in return, they may suffer a pay cut. In fact, when the gap between
the arrival rate of job offers for employed and unemployed job seekers is not too large, we
show that mismatched workers receive a lower wage than less-educated workers. This
result differs sharply from the one holding without OTJ search, where over-qualified
workers get paid a higher wage, since they need to sacrifice all their outside options.
Our simulations suggest that the above effects may have important implications
for the overall degree of wage inequality. For plausible parameter values we find that
the total variance of the wage distribution is much larger than when JTJ transitions
are ignored. Moreover, a significant fraction of this additional wage dispersion is due
to wage differentials among high-educated workers. Thus, it seems worthwhile to ex-
plore whether an increase in the frequency of JTJ transitions may have contributed to
the widening of the within-education and within-occupation wage dispersions that is
observed notably in the US, but also in many other OECD countries since the 1980s
(see, e.g., Katz and Autor, 1999). Moreover, our results suggest that the introduc-
tion of JTJ transitions between different jobs or occupations may help to improve the
poor performance of standard search and matching models in replicating the observed
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variability of wages (see, Hornstein et al., 2006).
Finally, we briefly outline the connections with two related studies which also ad-
dress the issue of OTJ search. Pissarides (1994) proposes the same wage-setting mech-
anism we use here, but in a model with homogeneous workers and heterogeneous jobs.
By assuming that match productivity is growing over time (due to learning by doing),
he is able to construct a model in which JTJ transitions only take place at short job
tenures. Workers can therefore get locked into bad jobs. We ignore these tenure effects
on search intensity to focus on the case where OTJ search depends on match quality and
the educational attainment of the worker. In accordance with the empirical evidence
(see Section 2), this generates a model in which quits are more prominent among over-
qualified workers and affect the labour market position of the less-educated workers.
By considering a homogeneous pool of workers, these aspects are absent in Pissarides’
analysis. Closer in spirit to our work is Gautier (2002). He uses essentially the same
setup for production as we do. However, by construction, the wages in his model are
independent of the aggregate labour market outcomes. This simplifies considerably the
analysis, but it leaves out many interesting issues such as the relationship between the
frequency of JTJ transitions and the degree of wage inequality that are addressed in
our paper.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reports some empirical
evidence to motivate the analysis. Section 3 lays out the model. Section 4 describes
the potential set of equilibria while Section 5 shows that the introduction of OTJ search
enhances the likelihood of having a unique cross-skill matching equilibrium. Section
6 examines the comparative statics of the model in response to demand and supply
shifts for the special case of equal contact rates. Section 7 presents some numerical
results on the effect of these changes in a calibrated economy with realistic parameter
values. Finally, Section 8 concludes. Proofs of the main propositions are gathered in
two Appendices (A and B).
2. A Brief Look at the Evidence on JTJ Flows
Recent evidence suggests that JTJ transitions are an important element of the total
labour market turnover. For example, regarding the US labour market, Fallick and
Fleischman (2001) report that more than four million workers changed employer during
an average month in the 1990s, about the same number as the workers who left the
labour force from employment and more than twice the number who moved from
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employment to unemployment. Further, the total separation rate falls with age and
is negatively correlated with the educational attainment of workers, but in relative
terms the JTJ transitions account for a much larger share of total separations for
college workers (50%) than for high-school dropouts (30%). Similar evidence has been
provided by Nagypál (2003) who reports that around 55% of the total separations
of workers with a college degree are due to JTJ flows, whereas that proportion falls
to 34% for workers without a high school degree. Moreover, about 70% of the high-
educated workers who undertake a JTJ transition do so for job-related reasons - as
opposed to personal quits, layoffs or end of contract - whereas that fraction is below
60% for less-educated workers. Although the categorization of quits versus layoffs could
be questioned - since it relies on the subjective self-report of the worker - the above
evidence seems to point out that JTJ flows are a key feature in explaining separations
and that OTJ search is more prevalent among high-educated workers.
Similar findings hold for Europe. For example, JTJ flows in the UK accounted for at
least 40% of all separations in the 1980s (see, Pissarides, 1994). Elsewhere in Europe
these flows appear to be less frequent, but in relative terms the turnover pattern is
similar to that in the US. For example, Bachman (2006) estimates that JTJ transitions
represented on average around 35% of the monthly separation flows in Germany during
1980-2000, and that this proportion reaches 52% among high-educated workers. In line
with these findings, Theodossiu and Zangadelis (2007) report cross-country evidence
on JTJ transitions during the 1990s for six of the main EU economies. Although their
estimates are likely to be upward biased relative to those quoted before due to their
lower frequency - the estimates are based on year-to-year turnover rates in the eight
available waves (1994-2001) of the European Community Household Panel (ECHP)-
they report that JTJ transitions account for between 40% to 55 % of total separations
in the different EU countries. Moreover, from a logit regression on the determinants
of JTJ transitions, they also find that the probability of engaging in these transitions
increases with workers’ educational attainment.
Finally, since the focus of our study is on JTJ transitions by over-qualified workers,
it is interesting to report some recent evidence provided by Eurostat (2003) about
the gap in percentage points (p.p.) between the shares of workers who declare to be
performing OTJ search in two groups of college graduates: (i) those who declare to
be over-qualified for their current jobs, and (ii) those who declare to be appropriately
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matched.4 These differentials are reported for a number of EU countries and range
from 1.5 p.p. in Denmark and Finland to about 7-8 p.p. in Italy, Portugal and Spain.
Thus, this evidence seemingly confirms that the pursuit of a better job is a relevant
determinant of OTJ search among high-educated workers who feel over-qualified.
3. The Model
This section introduces our matching model with heterogeneous agents and OTJ search.
Time is continuous and we restrict attention to steady states.
3.1. Main Assumptions
The economy is populated by a continuum of heterogeneous workers with measure
normalized to one and a large continuum of identical firms. All agents are risk-neutral
and infinitely-lived and discount the future at the common rate r.
Production of the unique final good requires a job and a worker. We use the index
j ∈ {h, l} to distinguish the two types of workers in our economy: high-educated (h)
and less-educated (l) workers. The fraction of less-educated workers in the population
of workers is denoted by µ ∈ (0, 1) which is assumed to be exogenously determined in
our model. Likewise, there are two types of jobs that can be either filled or vacant.
They are indexed by i ∈ {s, n} and it is assumed that each firm can have at most one
job. An unskilled job (n) can be filled by either type of worker and produces a constant
flow of y(n) units of output. Thus, the productivity of these jobs does not depend on
the type of worker. By contrast, skilled jobs (s) can only be filled by high-educated
workers, whose productivity in these jobs, y(s), is larger than y(n). In sum, match
productivity is as follows:
Match productivity
Workers / Jobs Unskilled Skilled
l-type y(n) 0
h-type y(n) y(s)(> y(n))
Our assumptions imply that high-educated workers are more productive than less-
educated workers when they manage to find a skilled job. However, in a market subject
4The data come from an ad hoc module carried out by Eurostat in the 2000 EU Labour Force Survey
designed to collect specific information on the transition from the education system to working life in
EU countries.
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to search frictions, high-educated workers may find it optimal to accept both types
of jobs in equilibrium. When this occurs, using AV’s terminology, we say that the
equilibrium exhibits cross-skill matching. Conversely, when they refuse unskilled jobs,
the equilibrium exhibits ex-post segmentation.
Finally, in our economy, the turnover of workers is partly endogenous. A match may
be dissolved when: (i) the worker decides to quit because a better job has been located,
or (ii) the job is destroyed by a shock. This second source of turnover is exogenous and
follows a Poisson process with arrival rate δ. The unemployed workers receive a flow
payoff b from home production and leisure that satisfies the restriction that b < y(n),
while the firms with a vacant job incur a flow cost c until the job is filled. Since we
assume free entry, firms will exhaust the rents from job creation in equilibrium.
3.2. Matching
Job seekers and firms with vacant jobs are matched together in pairs through an imper-
fect matching technology. Like AV, we assume that the matching process is undirected.
However, by contrast, we allow for OTJ search by mismatched workers, while they
only allow for job search during unemployment. A mismatched worker can therefore
move to a better job without an intervening spell of unemployment. Below we show
that this feature reduces the opportunity cost of mismatch for high-educated workers.
The total flow of random contacts between a job seeker and a firm is determined
by a standard CRS meeting function:
m[v(n) + v(s), u(l) + u(h) + λe(n, h)],
where u(j) is the mass of unemployed workers of type j , v(i) is the mass of vacancies
of type i, and e(n, h) is the mass of mismatched workers whose relative search intensity
is captured by the parameter λ ∈ [0, 1].5 The case where λ = 0 replicates AV’s setup
while λ = 1 corresponds to the case in which the arrival rate of job offers is independent
of the employment status of the job seeker. Finally, we assume that m[., .] is strictly
increasing in both arguments and we define the effective labour market tightness by
θ = [v(n)+ v(s)]/[u(l)+u(h)+λe(n, h)]. Accordingly, we can write the contact rate of
5The restriction to the unit interval is natural. It implies that mismatch tends to have a cost
because employed workers have a (weakly) lower contact rate than unemployed workers. In fact, in a
model with endogeneous search effort, the workers would never choose a value for λ > 1 if the search
costs during employment are at least as high as during unemployment.
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a firm as p(θ) = m(1, 1θ ), while the contact rate of a job seeker is equal to f(θ) = θp(θ)
during unemployment and λf(θ) ≤ f(θ) during employment. The properties of m[., .]
guarantee that p0(θ) < 0, f 0(θ) > 0 and we assume that limθ→0 p(θ) = limθ→∞ f(θ) =∞
and limθ→∞ p(θ) = limθ→0 f(θ) = 0.
3.3. Wage Determination
As mentioned earlier, our analysis focuses on one important aspect of OTJ search,
namely the pursuit of a better match. However, since the work of Burdett and
Mortensen (1998) it is well known that workers may use OTJ search to obtain a higher
wage in the same type of job. This observation has stimulated a lot of research on the
impact of OTJ search on the process of wage determination. For example, Postel-Vinay
and Robin (2002) and Cahuc et al. (2006) consider extensions of the Burdett-Mortensen
model in which employers are allowed to match the offer of a rival employer. In both
instances, workers can exploit the outside offers from rival employers to obtain a pay
rise in their current jobs. Alternatively, Shimer (2006) reconsiders the arguments of
Burdett and Mortensen in a standard matching model with OTJ search and bilateral
bargaining. He shows that the standard surplus-sharing rule may not be optimal in
this environment because firms may find it profitable to pay a higher wage in order to
reduce the probability of a quit.
Allowing for these features would complicate our model a lot. Hence, to avoid these
complications, we follow Pissarides (1994) in adopting two strong simplifying assump-
tions regarding wage determination. The first one is that wages are set according to
a linear surplus-splitting rule that entitles workers to a fraction β ∈ (0, 1) of the flow
rents, whereas the second one is that the wage can be revised continuously at no cost,
so that long-term contracts are ruled out. Thus, even if an employed worker could start
negotiations with a new employer before resigning from the current job, this would not
affect the equilibrium outcome. The new employer would immediately renegotiate the
wage once the worker breaks the relationship with the previous employer.6
6Notice that our assumptions also eliminate the scope for equilibria with matching wage offers. For
example, firms with unskilled jobs could try to match the rival offers from firms with skilled jobs if
w(s, h) < y(n). However, the mismatched workers will reject these matching offers. They realise that
the employer will renegotiate the wage back to its initial level once the worker has declined the rival
offer. Thus, in equilibrium the mismatched workers will always accept rival offers from firms with
skilled job as long as w(s, h) > w(n, h). Below we will show that this condition always holds in our
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These assumptions lead to a wage-setting rule that looks identical to the typical
Nash bargaining solution in models without OTJ search. Formally, let U(j) denote the
value of unemployment for a worker of type j, and V (i) the value of a vacant job of
type i. Similarly, let J(i, j) andW (i, j) denote the proceeds for the firm and the worker
from a match that combines a job of type i and a worker of type j. In any match with
a positive match surplus S(i, j) ≡ W (i, j) + J(i, j) − V (i) − U(j), the constant wage
w(i, j) then satisfies the following sharing rule:
(1− β)[W (i, j)− U(j)] = β[J(i, j)− V (i)]. (1)
Condition (1) rules out any wage differences among identical workers in the same
type of job. Finally, in the rest of the analysis we assume that the mismatched workers
only quit when they find a better-paid skilled job.7
3.4. Asset Values
We are now in a position to define the asset value equations of workers and firms.
Let ζ = v(n)/[v(n) + v(s)] denote the share of unskilled vacancies. Then the asset
value of a high-educated worker during unemployment, U(h), satisfies:
rU(h) = b+ f(θ) [ζmax(W (n, h)− U(h), 0) + (1− ζ)(W (s, h)− U(h))] . (2)
The high-educated job seeker will accept an unskilled job if this improves her lifetime
income. The associated payoff in this case, denoted as W (n, h), is given by:
rW (n, h) = w(n, h) + δ[U(h)−W (n, h)] + λf(θ)(1− ζ)[W (s, h)−W (n, h)], (3)
where the last term on the right-hand side of (3) corresponds to the expected gain from
successful OTJ search, which depends on the search-intensity parameter λ.
The rest of the asset value equations of workers are standard (see Pissarides, 2000):
model.
7Alternatively, we could have assumed that workers incur an infinitesimally small cost ε ' 0 when
they switch employer. In this setting, the mismatched workers would strictly prefer to remain with
their current employer if they meet another firm with an unskilled job. Moreover, the same assumption
would eliminate the theoretical possibility of OTJ search by appropriately matched workers.
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rU(l) = b+ f(θ)ζ[W (n, l)− U(l)] (4)
rW (n, l) = w(n, l) + δ[U(l)−W (n, l)] (5)
rW (s, h) = w(s, h) + δ[U(h)−W (s, h)]. (6)
Next, to define the asset value equations of vacant jobs, we denote the share of
unemployed job seekers by ψ = [u(l)+u(h)]/[u(l)+u(h)+λe(n, h)]. Similarly, we let φ =
u(l)/[u(l)+u(h)] denote the share of less-educated workers in the pool of unemployed.
Accordingly, we can write the asset value equation for an unskilled vacancy, V (n), as :
rV (n) = −c+ ψp(θ) [φ(J(n, l)− V (n)) + (1− φ)max(J(n, h)− V (n), 0)] , (7)
while the corresponding expression for a skilled vacancy, V (s), satisfies:
rV (s) = −c+ (1− ψφ)p(θ)[J(s, h)− V (s)]. (8)
Finally, the asset values of filled jobs verify:
rJ(s, h) = y(s)− w(s, h) + δ[V (s)− J(s, h)] (9)
rJ(n, l) = y(n)− w(n, l) + δ[V (n)− J(n, l)] (10)
rJ(n, h) = y(n)− w(n, h) + (δ + λf(θ)(1− ζ))[V (n)− J(n, h)]. (11)
The fact that the separation rate in (11) is larger than δ just reflects that mismatched
workers will leave their employer when they find a skilled job. In the next sections, we
will analyze how this feature affects the decisions of firms and workers in equilibrium.
4. Equilibria
In this section we proceed to define the set of equilibria. Since we are primarily in-
terested in the equilibria with cross-skill matching and OTJ search, we shall initially
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assume that the surplus of filling an unskilled job with a high-educated worker is non-
negative, namely S(n, h) ≥ 0. The alternative case of ex-post segmentation, where
S(n, h) < 0, will be discussed at the end of this section.
It is useful to start with the derivation of the equilibrium surplus expressions. From
(5), (10) and the free-entry condition for unskilled jobs, V (n) = 0, it follows that S(n, l)
satisfies:
(r + δ)S(n, l) = y(n)− rU(l). (12)
Together with (1), this implies that the wage of less-educated workers, w(n, l), is
given by:
w(n, l) = rU(l) + β[y(n)− rU(l)]. (13)
Likewise, regarding high-educated workers in skilled jobs, the corresponding expres-
sions are:
(r + δ)S(s, h) = y(s)− rU(h) (14)
w(s, h) = rU(h) + β[y(s)− rU(h)], (15)
where we have used (1), (6), (9) plus the free-entry condition for skilled jobs, V (s) = 0.
The above solutions for the appropriately matched workers are standard, while we
obtain the following less conventional solutions for over-qualified workers:8
[r + δ + λf(θ)(1− ζ)]S(n, h) = y(n)− rU(h) + f(θ)λ(1− ζ)βS(s, h), (16)
w(n, h) = rU(h) + β[y(n)− rU(h)]− f(θ)λ(1− ζ)β(1− β)S(s, h). (17)
Comparison of (16) with (12) reveals two important differences. First, the output
generated by a mismatched worker is discounted at a higher rate than the output of
a less-educated worker. Second, the value of S(n, h) includes the expected gains from
OTJ search which amount to f(θ)λβ(1 − ζ)S(s, h). Since the actual gains from OTJ
8As mentioned earlier, since OTJ search is costless, we only have to analyze the matching decisions
of the high-educated workers.
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search will accrue to the worker and not to the firm, mismatched workers compensate
their employers by accepting a wage reduction given by f(θ)λ(1− ζ)β(1− β)S(s, h).
Next, to obtain the reservation values of the two types of workers, we rewrite (2)
and (4) as:
rU(l) = b+ f(θ)ζβS(n, l) (18)
rU(h) = b+ f(θ)β [ζS(n, h) + (1− ζ)S(s, h)] . (19)
Using (12), (14) and (16) this yields the following expressions:
rU(l) =
(r + δ)b+ f(θ)βζy(n)
r + δ + f(θ)βζ
(20)
rU(h) =
(r + δ)α1b+ f(θ)β [ζ(r + δ)y(n) + (1− ζ)α2y(s)]
α2α3 + (r + δ)f(θ)βζ(1− λ)
, (21)
where α1 = r+δ+f(θ)λ(1−ζ), α2 = r+δ+f(θ)λ(1−ζ+βζ) and α3 = r+δ+f(θ)(1−ζ)β
are discount factors.
Finally, inserting the previous expressions for S(i, j) and rU(j) plus the wage rule
(1) into both (7) and (8), we can write the two zero-profit conditions V (n) = 0 and
V (s) = 0, respectively, as:
c
(1− β)p(θ)ψ =
∙
φ[y(n)− b]
r + δ + f(θ)ζβ
+
(1− φ){α3 [y(n)− b]− f(θ)β(1− λ)(1− ζ) [y(s)− b]}
α2α3 + (r + δ)f(θ)βζ(1− λ)
¸
,
(22)
c
(1− β)p(θ)(1− ψφ) =
∙
α1 [y(s)− b] + f(θ)βζ[y(s)− y(n)]
α2α3 + (r + δ)f(θ)βζ(1− λ)
¸
. (23)
Equations (22) and (23) constitute the first two equilibrium relationships of the model.
The remaining ones arise from the steady state flow conditions for u(l), u(h) and e(n, h).
Denoting the total mass of unemployed workers by u ≡ u(h) + u(l), we can express
these conditions as follows:
ζf(θ)φu = δ(µ− φu) (24)
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f(θ)(1− φ)u = δ[1− µ− (1− φ)u] (25)
ζf(θ)(1− φ)u = [δ + f(θ)λ(1− ζ)]e(n, h). (26)
All together, these five conditions lead to the following definition of a cross-skill match-
ing equilibrium when OTJ search is present:
Definition 1 A steady-state equilibrium with cross-skill matching and OTJ search con-
sists of a set of value functions for W (i, j), J(i, j), V (i), U(j) and S(i, j) that satisfy
(2)-(11), (12), (14) and (16) plus a vector {u, θ, φ, ζ, ψ} such that
1. All matches produce a non-negative surplus for the equilibrium values of {θ, ζ}.
2. The vector {u, θ, φ, ζ, ψ} solves the free entry conditions (22) and (23) plus the
steady state conditions (24) to (26).
Our last task in this section is to describe the necessary conditions that define an
equilibrium with ex-post segmentation. As mentioned earlier, this type of equilibrium
arises in AV’s model (λ = 0) when high-educated workers make up a relatively large
share of the population and/or when the productivity gap between jobs is relatively
large. In the next section, we will show that these conditions still hold in our model
with OTJ search when λ is relatively small but positive.
Formally, when high-educated workers refuse to work in unskilled jobs (S(n, h) < 0),
the solution for rU(h) in (21) reduces to:
rU(h) =
(r + δ)b+ f(θ)(1− ζ)βy(s)
r + δ + f(θ)(1− ζ)β ,
while the solution for rU(l) still satisfies (20). Replacing these solutions into (12) and
(14), we find that:
S(n, l) =
y(n)− b
r + δ + f(θ)ζβ
; S(s, h) =
y(s)− b
r + δ + f(θ)(1− ζ)β
As a result, an ex-post segmentation equilibrium can be defined as follows:
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Definition 2 A steady state equilibrium with ex-post segmentation can be summarized
by a vector {θ, φ, ζ, u} that generates an asset value for high-educated workers rU(h) >
y(n) and solves the following four equilibrium conditions:
c
(1− β)p(θ) = φ
[y(n)− b]
r + δ + f(θ)βζ
(27)
c
(1− β)p(θ) = (1− φ)
[y(s)− b]
r + δ + f(θ)β(1− ζ) (28)
f(θ)ζφu = δ(µ− φu) (29)
f(θ)(1− ζ)(1− φ)u = δ(1− µ− (1− φ)u). (30)
Obviously, JTJ transitions are precluded in this segregated equilibrium since the mass
of mismatched workers is equal to zero.
5. Equilibrium Configurations
In this section we provide a complete characterization of the possible equilibrium con-
figurations. Our goal is to prove that the introduction of OTJ search (0 < λ ≤ 1)
enhances the likelihood of having an equilibrium with cross-skill matching. To do so, it
is useful to recall that the existence of this equilibrium is guaranteed under two condi-
tions: (i) firms must be willing to provide both types of jobs, and (ii) the high-educated
workers must be willing to accept employment in unskilled jobs. To guarantee condi-
tion (i), it is sufficient to rule out the corner solution in which firms exclusively offer
unskilled jobs. The following result shows that this requirement places a lower-bound
on the share of high-educated workers and on the productivity differential between
skilled and unskilled jobs:
Proposition 1. A sufficient condition for firms to offer both skilled and unskilled
jobs is that
y(s)− y(n)
y(n)− b >
µ(r + δ)
(1− µ)[r + δ + f(θ∗)β] (31)
where θ∗ is the labour market tightness associated with a single job-type distribution.
Proof. See Appendix A.
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Next, in order to guarantee condition (ii), we need to ensure that high-educated
workers and firms with unskilled jobs are willing to match, i.e., S(n, h) > 0. In Ap-
pendix A we show that this leads to the following condition:
Proposition 2. A necessary condition for a cross-skill matching equilibrium to
exist is that,
y(s)− y(n)
y(n)− b <
r + δ + f(θ)βλ
f(θ)β(1− λ)(1− ζ) (32)
for the equilibrium values of θ and ζ in this type of equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix A.
In general, condition (32) can only be verified a fortiori once the equilibrium values
of θ and ζ have been determined. However, there is an exception. Since the right-hand
side of (32) approaches infinity as λ tends to 1, the above inequality is always verified
in an economy where employed and unemployed job seekers face equal contact rates,
i.e., λ = 1. Hence, the following result holds:
Corollary 1. With the same search intensity for all job seekers (λ = 1), there
always exists a cross-matching equilibrium when condition (31) is satisfied.
To gain some intuition for this benchmark result, it is useful to consider the expres-
sion for S(n, h) that is obtained after replacing U(h) in (16) by (19):
S(n, h) =
y(n)− [b+ f(θ)(1− λ)(1− ζ)βS(s, h)]
r + δ + f(θ)[λ(1− ζ + βζ] . (33)
From the numerator of (33) it follows that S(n, h) > 0 when y(n) is larger than
the bracketed term which measures the opportunity cost of a high-educated worker
accepting an unskilled job. When OTJ search is ruled out (λ = 0), this opportunity cost
is simply the expected return of a high-educated worker under ex-post segmentation.
The effect of allowing for OTJ search is to reduce this opportunity cost. In fact,
when λ = 1, the only component of the opportunity cost is b since mismatched and
unemployed job seekers face the same contact rates. Given our assumption that y(n) >
b, this immediately implies that S(n, h) is positive.
Proposition 2 provided the necessary condition for the existence of a cross-skill
matching equilibrium when firms offer both types of jobs. The next proposition goes
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one step further by providing a sufficient condition in terms of λ that rules out ex-
post segmentation. The proof is again based on the idea that a rise in λ lowers the
opportunity cost of mismatch for high-educated workers:
Proposition 3. For any economy that satisfies (31) there exists a value λ ∈ [0, 1)
such that the equilibrium always exhibits cross-skill matching for any λ ∈ (λ, 1].
Proof. See Appendix A.
The threshold value λ is defined the lowest value of λ at which a high-educated
worker and a firm with an unskilled job can deviate from an ex-post segmentation
equilibrium without incurring a loss. Thus, the equilibrium always exhibits cross-skill
matching for λ > λ.
Notice, however, that the above argument does not rule out the existence of a cross-
skill matching equilibrium at lower values than λ. By definition, an individual firm-
worker pair will incur a loss if they deviate from an ex-post segmentation equilibrium
for any λ < λ. Yet, if all high-educated workers would collectively start to accept
unskilled jobs, firms would react by increasing the proportion of unskilled jobs in the
economy. This shift in the job distribution would make skilled jobs more scarce and,
hence, for the same value of λ, all high-educated workers may now find it optimal to
accept unskilled jobs. Thus, for some intermediate values of λ the equilibrium may
exhibit either cross-skill matching or ex-post segmentation. For future purposes, we
denote the lower-bound of this interval as λ so that multiple equilibria are possible in
the range [λ, λ].
Finally, using similar arguments, it is easy to prove that the introduction of OTJ
search never leads to the destruction of a cross-skill matching equilibrium:
Proposition 4. Consider an economy that generates a cross-skill matching equi-
librium when λ = 0. The same economy will have a cross-skill matching equilibrium
with OTJ search for any λ > 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Summing up, the results in Propositions (1) to (4) imply that OTJ search unam-
biguously narrows the scope for equilibria with ex-post segmentation, leading to the
following two alternative equilibrium configurations:
1. The economy always exhibits cross-skill matching.
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2. The economy exhibits cross-skill matching for any λ > λ and ex-post segmenta-
tion for λ < λ, while it may exhibit both types of equilibria for the intermediate
range of values λ ∈ [λ, λ].
Finally, from the discussion in Appendix A, it becomes clear that the values of the
above-mentioned thresholds λ and λ depend positively on the share of skilled jobs,
1−ζ, and on the value of S(s, h). Hence, in line with AV, we find that the likelihood of
having an ex-post segmentation equilibrium increases both with the productivity gap
between skilled and unskilled jobs and the share of high-educated workers.
6. Equal Contact Rates
Our previous analysis has shown that the introduction of OTJ search tends to narrow
the set of equilibria. The aim of this section is to show that it also has interesting
implications for the distribution of wages and the response of the economy to shocks.
To illustrate these effects, we restrict the analysis to an economy with equal contact
rates (λ = 1), though our previous arguments imply that the results below also hold
for values of λ sufficiently close to unity (see Section 7.3).
6.1. Wages
Our first objective is to show that the introduction of OTJ search raises the degree
of wage inequality in the economy. To derive the distribution of wages in an economy
with λ = 1, it is useful to start from the following Lemma:
Lemma 1. In any economy with equal contact rates that satisfies (31), 0 <
S(n, h) < S(n, l).
Proof. See Appendix A.
The insight for this result (see equation A. 14 in Appendix A) is that mismatched
workers produce the same increment in output as less-educated workers do, namely,
y(n) − b. Yet, for the former, this “flow surplus” is discounted at a higher rate due
to the possibility of a quit. Hence, in principle, firms would prefer to hire a more
stable less-educated worker. Given our surplus-sharing rule, the mismatched workers
therefore have to accept a lower wage than the less-educated workers, as shown in the
next result:
Proposition 5. In any economy with equal contact rates that satisfies (31),
w(n, h) < w(n, l) < w(s, h).
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Proof. See Appendix A.
The above result differs sharply from the one obtained with λ = 0. In the latter
case, the over-qualified workers receive a higher wage than the less-educated workers
since they have to sacrifice their entire reservation wage, rU(h), when they accept
an unskilled job. When λ = 1, by contrast, mismatched workers only need to receive
compensation for rU(h)−f(θ)(1−ζ)βS(s, h) = b+f(θ)ζβS(n, h). From (18), this value
is smaller than rU(l) implying that mismatched workers receive a lower wage than the
less-educated workers. Thus, the fact that OTJ search reduces the opportunity cost of
mismatched workers also shows up in the bargained wages. This interesting source of
within-group wage inequality is ignored in conventional matching models. Furthermore,
for future purposes, it is important to notice that w(n, h) does not depend directly on
y(s). Below we show that this feature has important implications for the response of
the labour market to shifts in the relative productivity of skilled jobs. However, before
examining these comparative statics results, we need to establish the conditions that
guarantee uniqueness of the equilibrium.
6.2. Uniqueness
To obtain a set of conditions that rule out the possibility of multiple cross-skill matching
equilibria, we solve the flow conditions (24) to (26) for u, ζ and ψ in terms of θ and φ.
Substituting the resulting expressions into the two free-entry conditions (22) and (23)
yields a system of two equations in two unknowns where conditions for uniqueness can
be derived.
The only complication is that we have three types of job seekers. In effect, from the
perspective of firms, a change in the value of θ induces two effects: a standard congestion
effect, as p0(θ) < 0, and a novel composition effect, as the fraction of unemployed less-
educated workers in the mass of job seekers, ψ, tends to fall with higher values of θ.
Thus, à priori it is unclear how a change in θ affects the matching rate of skilled jobs,
(1 − φψ)p(θ). From the perspective of high-educated workers, a similar ambiguity
arises since f 0(θ) > 0 and the share of skilled jobs, 1 − ζ, falls for higher values of θ.
Nonetheless, for relatively large values of µ, it can be shown that these composition
effects are small compared to the changes in f(θ) and p(θ).
Using this feature we are able to show that the equilibrium is unique if: (i) µ is at
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least 0.5, so that ∂[p(θ)(1− θψ)]/∂θ < 0 and ∂[f(θ)(1− ζ)] > 0,9 (ii) workers obtain
at least half the surplus of any match (β ≥ 0.5), and (iii) the productivity differential
between skilled and unskilled jobs, y(s) − y(n), is sufficiently large (see Appendix B
for details).
The unique equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 1. The free entry locus of unskilled
jobs, V (n) = 0, is upward sloping since firms with unskilled jobs prefer to hire less-
educated workers. Thus, a rise in tightness, θ, needs to be compensated by a rise in the
proportion of less-educated workers in the total mass of unemployed, φ. Conversely,
the free entry locus for skilled jobs, V (s) = 0, is downward sloping because these jobs
can only be performed by high-educated workers so that a lower value of φ (a larger
fraction of unemployed high-educated workers) is needed when θ increases. Therefore,
both loci can cross at most once.
[Insert Figure 1]
6.3. Responses to Shifts in Demand and Supply of Skills
As shown above, the pool of job seekers contains a mass of mismatched workers
who temporarily accept a job below their qualifications in return for a lower wage than
equally productive less-educated workers. In this section we show how this feature
alters the response of the labour market to a rise in the productivity of skilled jobs
and/or the share of high-educated workers. Following the existing literature, we refer
to these changes as skill-biased technological change (SBTC) and skill upgrading (SU),
respectively, and throughout the analysis we assume that the conditions for uniqueness
hold.
Skill-biased Technological Change
The effects of SBTC are illustrated in Figure 2. The increase in y(s) raises the profits
of skilled jobs while the profits of unskilled jobs are unaffected because y(s) drops out
of equation (22) when λ = 1. Hence, the main effect of SBTC is an increase in the
mass of skilled vacancies, v(s). As a result, the V (s) = 0 locus shifts upwards along
the V (n) = 0 locus, leading to a rise of θ and φ.
[Insert Figure 2]
9In our numerical simulations these derivatives are always negative for any µ ≥ 0.5.
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The increase in θ reduces the unemployment rate of high-educated workers -labeled
by eu(h) (= u(h)/(1 − µ) = δ/[δ + f(θ)])- while we cannot draw definite conclusions
about the unemployment rate of less-educated workers -denoted as eu(l) (= u(l)/µ =
δ/[δ+ ζf(θ)]). The reason is that the rise in v(s) causes a fall in the share of unskilled
vacancies, ζ. These results can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 6. In a unique cross-skill matching equilibrium with λ = 1, SBTC
increases θ and φ, and reduces eu(h), while its effect on eu(l) is ambiguous.
Once more, this comparative statics result differs from the one derived by AV. In
effect, for the case of cross-skill matching, they show that SBTC raises eu(l) while it
has no effect on eu(h). Hence, the JTJ flows of high-educated workers increase (reduce)
the sensitivity of eu(h) (eu(l)) to changes in y(s).10 The stronger response of eu(h) is due
to the fact that skilled jobs can attract both unemployed and employed job seekers.
The supply of these jobs is therefore more elastic when λ = 1 than when λ = 0. Yet,
at the same time, the JTJ flows also insulate the profits of unskilled jobs from the
effects of SBTC because w(n, h) and V (n) do not directly depend on y(s). Thus, under
cross-skill matching the drop in unskilled vacancies turns out to be smaller than in
a model without JTJ transitions. Moreover, as explained before, the JTJ transitions
prevent a possible shift to ex-post segmentation that may be accompanied by a rise in
the unemployment rates of both types of workers as shown in AV (see Section 7.2 for
a numerical example).
Skill-upgrading
An increase in the share of high-educated workers leads to a similar shift in the relative
demand for workers as SBTC, because a rise in (1− µ) makes it easier for firms to fill
a skilled job. In this case, however, it is a priori ambiguous how the unemployment
rate of high-educated workers will respond since it depends on the relative size of the
shifts in the demand and the supply of these workers.
The ambiguous response of the labour market to SU is illustrated in Figure 3. The
10This result is unrelated to our assumption of a common value for b and c. In particular, we
would obtain the same result if the unemployment income of high-educated workers and the flow cost
of skilled vacancies are indexed to y(s). In our model, technological change is only neutral when
y(s), y(n), b and c all grow at the same rate. A shock to the relative productivity of workers can
therefore move the equilibrium to a different balanced growth rate in which the unemployment rate
of high-educated workers is permanently lower than before.
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reduction in µ shifts downwards both free-entry loci. Hence, we obtain a fall in φ,
whereas θ, and therefore eu(h) and eu(h), may go up or down. In sum:
Proposition 7. In a unique cross-skill matching equilibrium with λ = 1, SU
increases φ while its effects on θ, eu(l) and eu(h) are ambiguous.
[Insert Figure 3]
Despite the ambiguity, it is evident that a shift in the skill distribution should
provoke a stronger reaction of labour demand in our economy than in an economy
without OTJ search since mismatched workers do not drop out of the pool of job
seekers. Given AV’s finding that ∂θ/∂µ = 0 under cross-skill matching this suggests
that SU may actually lead to a fall in the unemployment rate of the high-educated
workers. In the next section we will present some simulations in which this is indeed
the case.
7. Numerical Solutions
In this section we report the results of some illustrative numerical simulations. Our
aim is to gauge the quantitative importance of the JTJ flows and their impact on the
distribution of jobs, wages and employment for different values of λ. Furthermore, at
the end of this section, we discuss to what extent the model is able to explain some of
the stylized facts regarding unemployment, wage inequality and JTJ flows in Europe
and the US.
7.1. The Benchmark Economy
Following Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001), we assume a standard Cobb-Douglas meet-
ing function with an elasticity of 0.5, i.e. f(θ) =
√
θ . Time is measured in quarters
and the rest of the parameter values are given by β = 0.5, r = 0.01, c = 0.5, δ = 0.1,
b = 0.1, y(s) = 1.5 , µ = 0.75, plus a normalized value y(n) = 1. This parameter
configuration is similar to the one used by AV.
[Insert Table 1]
The first column of Table 1 presents the labour market outcomes for our benchmark
economy with OTJ search and λ = 1 while, for comparative purposes, the second
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column reports results for λ = 0. For the chosen parameters unique cross-skill matching
equilibria are obtained in both instances. The first difference to highlight is that the
proportion of skilled jobs, 1− ζ, is much higher with OTJ search (33%) than without
OTJ (11%). This is so since firms are more willing to open skilled jobs in an economy
where mismatched workers remain in the pool of job seekers. Consequently, transitory
mismatch yields a higher unemployment rate of less-educated workers (10.9%) than
permanent mismatch (8.3%). At the equilibrium value of θ with λ = 1 (λ = 0), a
less-educated worker exits unemployment at a rate ζf(θ) = 0.817 (1.101) while a high-
educated worker does so at a rate f(θ) = 1.219 (1.236). Thus, with equal contact
rates, the job finding rate is 50% higher for the latter type of workers whereas it is only
12% higher if OTJ search is ignored. Given a job destruction rate of 10% this leads
to a 3.3 percentage-point higher unemployment rate for less-educated workers when
λ = 1, as opposed to only 0.8 percentage points when λ = 0. Thus, OTJ search leads
to predictions about the differential in unemployment rates by educational attainment
that are more consistent with the available evidence in most OECD countries.
The second difference worth stressing is that the share of mismatched workers
among the high-educated ones is much lower with λ = 1 (0.156 = 0.039/0.25) than
with λ = 0 (0.824 = 0.206/0.25). This again adds further realism to our model. Inter-
estingly, when λ = 1, JTJ transitions account for almost for 35% of all separations by
high-educated workers, i.e., a proportion which is in line with those reported in Section
2.11
Finally, to quantify the effect of these JTJ transitions on wage dispersion, we report
four useful statistics. As a proxy for the degree of between-group wage inequality, we
compute the ratio between the average wage of high-educated workers and the wage of
less-educated workers. Likewise, the within-education wage inequality is measured by
the ratio between the average wage of high-educated workers and their wage in unskilled
jobs. Finally, to control for the relative size of the two groups, we also compute the
total variance of the wage distribution which is further decomposed into a permanent
component due to between-group wage differences and a transitory component due
11The proportion of JTJ transitions in total separations of high-educated workers is computed as
the ratio between the flow of JTJ transitions in any small time interval dt (f(θ)(1− ζ)e(n, h)dt) and
the total flow of separations by this type of workers in the same time interval (f(θ)(1 − ζ)e(n, h) +
δ(1−µ−u(h))dt. Inserting into this ratio the outcomes reported in the first column of Table 1, yields
a value of 0.35.
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to within-group wage differences. These statistics are reported in the lower panels of
Table 1. They show that our benchmark model with λ = 1 yields considerably higher
wage dispersion than the alternative model without OTJ search. In the latter case, the
skill premium is less than 7% while the former generates 35.9%. Even more striking is
the difference in the degree of within-group wage inequality. Since mismatched workers
earn less than less-educated workers, our model can easily explain a gap of 60% between
the mean and the lowest wage of high-educated workers, while this gap is reduced to 2%
with λ = 0. A similar picture emerges when we look at the overall variance of the wage
distribution which is about fifteen times larger when λ = 1, and a substantial part of
this additional variance can be attributed to the wage dispersion among high-educated
workers.
7.2. Comparative Statics
Our next objective is to gauge how important are JTJ transitions in affecting the
response of the labour market to shifts in the relative productivity of skilled jobs. To
simulate the effects of SBTC, we raise the value of y(s) from its benchmark value of
1.5 to a value of 2. The results are summarized in the first two columns of Table 2
which, for brevity, reports the values of a subset of key variables which include the
labour market tightness, the unemployment rates of both types of workers, the share
of high-educated job seekers, and two measures of wage dispersion.
In our benchmark economy with equal contact rates (column 1) the increase in y(s)
leads to a fall of 0.6 p.p. in the unemployment rate of high-educated workers, eu(h) and
a rise of 0.3 p.p. in the unemployment rate of less-educated workers, eu(l). Thus, the
changes in both unemployment rates are small relative to the changes in productivity.
By contrast, the share of high-educated job seekers drops by as much as 6 p.p. while
the degree of between and within-group wage inequality increase by, 35.4% and 34.2%,
respectively. Hence, the bulk of the adjustment takes place via a change in wages
and an increase in the share of skilled jobs. Much more striking results are obtained
when λ = 0. In this case the strong increase in the outside option of high-educated
workers, U(h), induces a shift to an equilibrium with ex-post segmentation. As a result,
the unemployment rates for high- and less-educated workers jump up by 6.9 and 3.6
p.p., respectively.12 This drastic response to SBTC contrasts with the gradual changes
experienced by the unemployment rates when OTJ search is accounted for.
12Under cross-skill matching the effects are less dramatic. In this case, SBTC produces at most
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Finally, the last two columns of Table 2 report similar results for the case of SU,
which is captured by an increase in the share of high-educated workers, 1−µ, from 25%
to 50%. Again we have chosen a parameter configuration such that the new equilibrium
with λ = 0 exhibits ex-post segmentation. When comparing the results with those in
Table 1, we find a growing gap between the unemployment rates for the two groups
of workers alongside a widening of the between- and within group wage inequality.
The only qualitative difference with the case of SBTC is in the evolution of the share
of high-educated job seekers. While SBTC led to a reduction in this share, we now
observe a strong increase, from 34% to 49%. Finally, it is worthwhile to stress that the
increase in the fraction of high-educated workers gives rise to a small reduction in the
unemployment rate of this group. Thus, as anticipated in Section 5, our model exhibits
cohort-size effects. The intuition for these effects is that the JTJ flows make labour
demand so responsive to supply shifts that high-educated workers face a lower risk of
unemployment as they become more abundant in the population.13
[Insert Table 2]
7.3. Unequal Contact Rates
The two limiting cases analyzed above are useful for analytical purposes, but a realistic
value of λ probably lies somewhere in between of 0 and 1 (see Christensen et al., 2005).
To analyze this case we compute the labour market outcomes for a range of λ that
goes from 0.2 to our benchmark value of 1. Our main findings (available online) are
that the unemployment rates show little variation over this range relative to the rates
displayed in Table 1 with λ = 1. The bulk of the adjustment takes place through a
shift in the composition of employment and the pool of job seekers. In particular, since
mismatched workers move quicker to skilled jobs at higher values for λ, we obtain a
gradual monotonic reduction in the share of high-educated job seekers together with a
rise in the share of separations of high-educated workers that are due to JTJ transitions.
For example, at λ = 0.2 this last share is equal to 0.22, compared to 0.35 in the
benchmark model with λ = 1. Furthermore, as λ increases, there is a strong rise in the
a 1.3 p.p. increase in the unemployment rate of the less-educated workers, while the unemployment
rate of the high-educated workers is unaffected by the rise in y(s).
13Shimer (2001) uses a similar argument to explain the fall in the unemployment rate of young
workers when the baby-boom generation entered the U.S. labor market.
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degree of wage inequality, both between groups and within the cohort of high-educated
workers. The evolution of the wage of mismatched workers, w(n, h), is key for this
result. At the starting value of λ = 0.2, this wage exceeds the value of w(n, l) as in
AV, but w(n, h) falls steeply with λ and beyond a threshold of λ = 0.42, we find that
w(n, h) < w(n, l) (see Figure 4). Hence, our numerical example illustrates that the
result obtained in Proposition 5 still holds for positive values of λ below unity.
[Insert Figure 4]
7.4. Europe vs. US
As discussed in Section 2, JTJ transitions explain roughly a similar share (between
40% and 50%) of the separations in the EU and the US Further, two other well-known
stylized facts are that while the unemployment rate is higher in Europe, wage inequality
is higher in the US.
In this last section, we explore how our parameter choice in the benchmark model
could be modified to account simultaneously for these three stylized facts. To capture
the lower unemployment and higher wage inequality in the US, we assume that the
US labour market has a higher matching efficiency than the European one, so that
its meeting function changes from
√
θ to z
√
θ with z > 1. In our model, this change
would lead to lower unemployment rates for both types of workers and a rise in wage
inequality, replicating the evidence for the US. However, a logical consequence of this
higher matching efficiency would be a fall in the share of mismatched workers which
would reduce the proportion of the total separations of high-educated workers that JTJ
flows represents. Hence we need to consider an additional parameter change to capture
the similarity of these shares. One plausible assumption is that the higher flexibility
of the US labour market also results in a larger value for λ than in Europe. From
our previous simulations we know that a rise in λ leads to more quits and more wage
inequality, without a drastic change in the unemployment rates. Thus, we should be
able to account for all the stylized facts by assuming higher values of λ and z in the
US than in Europe.
Table 3 presents an example in which we compare the labour market outcomes for
an economy with z = 1.25 and λ = 1 (US) and another where z = 1 and λ = 0.5 (EU).
Inspection of the results shows that the first economy generates more wage inequality
and lower unemployment rates while the ratio between the JTJ transitions and the
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total flow of separations of the high-educated workers is almost identical (31%) in both
economies.
[Insert Table 3]
8. Conclusions
OTJ search by over-qualified workers is a prominent feature in labour markets. In this
paper we analyse how this phenomenon affects the structure of employment and wages
in an economy where high- and less-educated workers compete for unskilled jobs. From
a policy perspective, two results stand out. First, transitory mismatch is more harmful
for the labour market position of less-educated workers than permanent mismatch. It
induces a shift in the job distribution towards skilled jobs and it lowers the overall
stability of unskilled jobs. At the same time, however, we show that it also reduces the
sensitivity of the profits in unskilled jobs to changes in the upper-segment of the labour
market. As a result, shifts in the demand and supply of higher skills have a milder
impact on the unemployment rate of the less-educated workers than what is predicted
by models where OTJ search is ignored.
Our analysis focuses on a single motive for JTJ transitions, namely the pursuit
of a better match. A logical extension would be to consider alternative wage-setting
mechanisms that allow for wage dispersion among identical workers in the same type
of job. This extension would make JTJ transitions more frequent since workers may
try to use OTJ search to obtain a pay rise. However, this extension will not affect
qualitatively the main conclusions reached here, except those on wage dispersion.
A more challenging extension would be to explore the efficiency properties of the
JTJ transitions. The mobility decisions of workers are based on a comparison between
actual and future wages. There is clearly no reason why these decisions should be effi-
cient because the workers ignore both the negative effects on their incumbent employers
and the positive effect on future employers. In addition, the employed job seekers con-
gest the market for unemployed job seekers and their higher quit rate discourages the
creation of unskilled jobs. Since a utilitarian social planner would take all these effects
into account, it would be interesting to analyse under which conditions the planner
prefers more or less frequent JTJ transitions than in the decentralised economy.
Another avenue for future research would be to analyse the response of the economy
to aggregate productivity shocks. In an economy with costly OTJ search this could give
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rise to pro-cyclical fluctuations in the intensity of OTJ search as mismatched workers
search more intensively during booms. An interesting aspect of such an economy is that
the overall match quality changes over the cycle. From the viewpoint of less-educated
workers, a recession is therefore a period of low job creation and intense competition
with high-educated workers, while booms are periods of high job creation and a gradual
release of jobs that were previously occupied by high-educated workers.
Finally, as argued in the Introduction, Hornstein et al. (2006) have documented
that actual residual wage inequality in the US is twenty times larger than the one
predicted by a large class of search and matching models. They also claim that the
introduction of OTJ search only leads to a modest improvement. Our results seem
to suggest that this conclusion could be driven by the fact that Hornstein et al. only
consider OTJ search within narrowly defined markets. However, as shown in this
paper, high-educated workers are typically willing to accept a wide range of jobs. It
would therefore be interesting to analyze whether the introduction of OTJ search and
mismatch can improve the empirical performance of calibrated search and matching
models.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA    35 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0813
Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Consider an equilibrium in which firms offer exclusively unskilled jobs (ζ = 1). Then,
the asset value of vacancies would be given by:
rV (n) = −c+ p(θ)(1− β)y(n)− rU
r + δ
= 0, (A.1)
where
rU = b+ f(θ)β
µ
y(n)− rU
r + δ
¶
(A.2)
is the identical outside-option value of both types of workers. Let θ∗ denote the unique
value of the labour market tightness that solves (A.1) given (A.2). To rule out an
equilibrium of this type, it must hold that:
rV (s) = −c+ p(θ∗)(1− β)(1− µ)y(s)− rU
r + δ
> 0, (A.3)
namely, a deviant firm can make positive profits by opening a skilled job. Comparing
(A.1) and (A.3), it follows that this condition leads to the requirement that:
(1− µ) [y(s)− rU ] > y(n)− rU. (A.4)
Finally, solving for rU in (A.2) and replacing it into (A.4), yields (31).¥
Proof of Proposition 2
In a cross-skill matching equilibrium, all three possible types of matches need to gen-
erate a positive surplus. First, to show that S(n, l) > 0 and S(s, h) > 0, we proceed as
follows. First, substituting (20) into the right-hand side of (12) yields:
S(n, l) =
y(n)− b
r + δ + f(θ)ζβ
, (A.5)
while the solution for S(s, h) is obtained by substituting (21) into (14)
S(s, h) =
α1[y(s)− b] + f(θ)βζ[y(s)− y(n)]
α2α3 + (r + δ)f(θ)βζ(1− λ)
, (A.6)
where both surplus expressions are positive because b < y(n) < y(s).
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Next, the expression for S(n, h) can be obtained from (16) by using (14) and re-
placing S(s, h) by (A.6). After some algebraic manipulations, it becomes:
S(n, h) =
α3[y(n)− b]− f(θ)β(1− ζ)(1− λ)[y(s)− b]
α2α3 + (r + δ)f(θ)βζ(1− λ)
. (A.7)
The proof is completed by noticing that condition (32) is equivalent to S(n, h) ≥ 0,
namely, α3[y(n)− b] ≥ f(θ)β(1− ζ)(1− λ)[y(s)− b].¥
Proof of Proposition 3
Consider an economy with a unique ex-post segmentation equilibrium for λ = 0, and
let (θe, ζe) denote the associated equilibrium values for θ and ζ. In this economy, the
expected asset value of an unemployed high-educated worker is:
rU(h) = b+ f(θe)(1− ζe)βS(s, h), (A.8)
where S(s, h) = [y(s)− b]/[r+ δ+ f(θe)(1− ζe)β]. Since, high-educated workers refuse
to work in unskilled jobs in this case, it must be that S(n, h) < 0 which, in turn,
requires that rU(h) > y(n).
Now consider the same economy but with λ > 0. In this case, we can derive the
minimum wage at which a high-educated worker would be willing to accept an unskilled
job. Denote this wage by w. If w < y(n), then a high-educated worker and a firm with
an unskilled job can both obtain a gain if they accept to match and fix some wage
w ∈ (w, y(n)). In such a case, the equilibrium with ex-post segmentation would cease
to exist. Below we show that there always exists some value of λ < 1 for which this is
the case.
Formally, let Wn(w) denote the lifetime income of a deviant high-educated worker
who accepts an arbitrary wage w to work in an unskilled job. Since mismatched workers
will quit when they find a skilled job, the asset value equation for Wn(w) satisfies:
rWn(w) = w + δ [U(h)−Wn(w)] + λf(θe)(1− ζe)βS(s, h), (A.9)
which is strictly increasing in w. Combining (A.8) and (A.9), we find that:
Wn(w)− U(h) =
w − b− f(θe)(1− λ)(1− ζe)βS(s, h)
r + δ
. (A.10)
Likewise, the asset value of a firm with an unskilled job that offers a high-educated
worker a wage w satisfies:
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Jn(w) =
y(n)− w
r + δ + λf(θe)(1− ζe) . (A.11)
Now, we can define w implicitly by the following condition :
Wn(w) = U(h). (A.12)
From (A.10) it follows that the solution is given by:
w = b+ f(θe)(1− λ)(1− ζe)βS(s, h), (A.13)
that is, firms need to pay high-educated workers at least their opportunity cost. More-
over, (A.11) implies that a firm with an unskilled job would be willing to offer this min-
imum acceptable wage as long as y(n)−w ≥ 0. Notice that for λ = 0, w = rU(h) and
Jn(w) < 0 while for λ = 1, w = b and Jn(w) > 0. In other words, if workers cannot per-
form OTJ search, the equilibrium with ex-post segmentation is well defined because a
firm with an unskilled job would make negative profits if it were to pay a high-educated
worker her opportunity cost w = rU(h). On the contrary, when λ = 1, a mismatched
worker and an unemployed job seeker have the same chances to match with a skilled
job. Thus, the worker will be willing to accept this job provided that w ≥ b. Since
y(s) > b, a firm with an unskilled job can therefore make a high-educated worker an
offer w ∈ (b, y(n)) such that the worker and the firm are strictly better off when they
deviate.
From here, it follows that, for any pair (θe, ζe)∈ (0,∞) × (0, 1), there exists a
λ ∈ (0, 1) such that Jn(w) > 0 for any λ > λ. For given values of θ and ζ, the right-
hand side of (A.13) defines w as a continuously decreasing function of λ that maps [0, 1]
onto [b, rU(h)]. Thus, since b < y(n) < rU(h), there exists a unique value λ ∈ (0, 1),
denoted by λ, such that y(n)− w = 0 while Jn(w) > 0 for all λ > λ.¥
Proof of Proposition 4
Once more it holds that w = rU(h) for λ = 0 but this time we have that rU(h) < y(n)
because the equilibrium exhibits cross-skill matching. Thus, since w is decreasing in
λ, it must be that y(n) − w > 0 for any λ > 0. Consequently, in this case, a high-
educated worker and a firm with an unskilled job incur a loss if they deviate from the
equilibrium.¥
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Proof of Lemma 1
The surplus expressions for the general case of λ ∈ [0, 1] are provided in (22). For
λ = 1, these expressions satisfy the following condition:
S(n, h) =
y(n)− b
r + δ + f(θ) [1− ζ + βζ] ≤
y(n)− b
r + δ + f(θ)βζ
= S(n, l), (A.14)
with a strict inequality when ζ < 1. Notice that the assumption y(n) > b ensures that
both S(n, h) and S(n, l) are strictly positive for finite values of θ.¥
Proof of Proposition 5
The second inequality follows from the assumption that y(s) > y(n), so that U(h) >
U(l) when ζ < 1. Since w(s, h) = rU(h) + β [y(s)− rU(h)] and w(n, l) = rU(l) +
β [y(n)− b] this implies that w(s, h) > w(n, l). To obtain the first inequality, we insert
(19) into (17). Hence:
w(n, h) = b+ β[y(n)− b] + f(θ)β(1− β)ζS(n, h).
Similarly, after replacing U(l) in (13) by (18), we can rewrite the expression for w(n, l)
as:
w(n, l) = b+ β[y(n)− b] + f(θ)β(1− β)ζS(n, l)
From the above expressions, it holds that:
w(n, h)− w(n, l) = f(θ)β(1− β)ζ[S(n, h)− S(n, l)] < 0
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 1.¥
Appendix B: Uniqueness
To prove uniqueness it is convenient to rewrite the equilibrium conditions in the fol-
lowing way. First, we solve (24) and (25) for u and ζ in terms of θ and φ, yielding:
u(θ, φ) =
δ
δ + f(θ)
1− µ
1− φ, (A.15)
ζ(θ, φ) =
(1− φ)f(θ)µ+ δ(µ− φ)
f(θ)φ(1− µ) . (A.16)
Inspection of (A.16) shows that ∂ζ(.)/∂φ < 0 and ∂ζ(.)/∂θ > 0 (as φ > µ). Next, our
definition of ψ implies that ψ/(1 − ψ) = u/e(n, h). Thus, combining (26) and (A.16)
allows us to express ψ in terms of θ and φ, namely:
BANCO DE ESPAÑA    39 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0813
ψ(θ, φ) =
δ + f(θ)(1− ζ(θ, φ))
δ + f(θ)(1− ζ(θ, φ)) + f(θ)ζ(θ, φ)(1− φ) (A.17)
with ∂ψ(.)/∂θ < 0 and ∂ψ(.)/∂φ > 0. The next step is to substitute (A.16) and (A.17)
into the two free-entry conditions (22) and (23). Evaluating the resulting expressions
at λ = 1, this yields the following system of two equations in two unknowns (θ and φ):
p(θ)ψ(θ, φ)
∙
φ
r + δ + f(θ)ζ(θ, φ)β
+
(1− φ)
α2
¸
=
c
(1− β)[y(n)− b] , (A.18)
p(θ)(1− ψ(θ, φ)φ)
α3
∙
R− f(θ)βζ(θ, φ)
α2
¸
=
c
(1− β)[y(n)− b] , (A.19)
where R = [y(s)− b]/[y(n)− b] > 1.
In implicit form we shall refer to (A.18) and (A.19) as VN(θ, φ) = 0 and VS(θ, φ) = 0,
respectively. Our aim is to show that these two loci intersect at most once under the
following set of conditions: (1) There is a sufficiently large majority of less-educated
workers, so µ ≥ 0.5 (2) Workers obtain at least one half of the surplus and so β ≥ 0.5
and (3) R is sufficiently large. The first condition is needed to guarantee that the
composition effects are small so that ∂p(θ)(1 − ψφ)/∂θ) < 0 while ∂f(θ)(1 − ζ) > 0
which, in turn, imply that ∂α2/∂θ and ∂α3/∂θ are both positive.
Skilled jobs: To show that the locus associated with VS(θ, φ) = 0 has a negative
slope, we need to prove that:
dφ
dθ
¯¯¯¯
VS=0
= −∂VS/∂θ
∂VS/∂φ
< 0.
First, notice that the numerator can be written as follows:
∂VS
∂θ
=
1
α3
·
∙
R− βζf(θ)
α2
¸
· ∂[p(θ)(1− ψφ)]
∂θ
−p(θ)(1− ψφ)
(α3)2
·
∙
R− βζf(θ)
α2
¸
· ∂α3
∂θ
−p(θ)(1− ψφ)
α2α3
·
∙
r + δ
α2
¸
· βζ ∂f(θ)
∂θ
−p(θ)(1− ψφ)
α3
· βf(θ) · ∂
∂ζ
∙
ζ
α2
¸
· ∂ζ
∂θ
.
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Given our assumptions, all four terms are negative. Thus, ∂VS/∂θ < 0.
Next, the expression for the partial derivative ∂VS/∂φ is given by:
∂VS
∂φ
= −p(θ)
α3
∙
R− βζf(θ)
α2
¸
·
µ
ψ + φ
∂ψ
∂φ
¶
+
p(θ)(1− φψ)
(α3)2
·
∙
R− βζf(θ)
α2
− α3
(α2)2
(r + δ + f(θ))
¸
f(θ)β
∂ζ
∂φ
.
In principle, the sign of this expression is ambiguous since the last term between brack-
ets contains a positive and two negative terms. Nonetheless, using the feature that
α2 − α3 > 0, one can show that ∂VS/∂φ is unambiguously negative when the term
∙
R− r + δ + f(θ)[1 + βζ]
r + δ + f(θ)[1− ζ + βζ
¸
,
is positive. This sufficient condition requires that R is sufficiently larger than 1 which
is guaranteed by condition (3). Thus, since ∂VS/∂φ and ∂VS/∂θ are both negative, the
curve VS = 0 has a negative slope.
Unskilled jobs: To show that the VN(θ, φ) = 0 locus has a positive slope, it is
sufficient to show that:
dφ
dθ
¯¯¯¯
VN=0
= −∂VN/∂θ
∂VN/∂φ
> 0.
The numerator of this expression is given by:
∂VN
∂θ
=
∙
φ
r + δ + f(θ)ζβ
+
1− φ
α2
¸
·
∙
ψ
∂[p(θ)]
∂θ
+ p(θ)
∂ψ
∂θ
¸
−p(θ)ψ ·
∙
βφ
[r + δ + f(θ)ζβ]2
¸
·
∙
ζ
∂f(θ)
∂θ
+ f(θ)
∂ζ
∂θ
¸
−p(θ)ψ · (1− φ)
(α2)2
·
∙
(1− ζ + βζ)∂f(θ)
∂θ
− (1− β)f(θ)∂ζ
∂θ
¸
.
In equilibrium φ > 1− φ because φ > µ and µ ≥ 0.5. Moreover, α2 > r + δ + f(θ)ζβ
and, by condition (2), β ≥ 0.5. Using these results, it can be easily shown that the
above expression has a negative sign. Hence, ∂VN/∂θ < 0.
Finally, the derivative ∂VN/∂φ is given by:
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∂VN
∂φ
= p(θ) ·
∙
φ
r + δ + f(θ)ζβ
+
1− φ
α2
¸
· ∂ψ
∂φ
+p(θ)ψ ·
∙
1
r + δ + f(θ)ζβ
− 1
α2
¸
−p(θ)ψ · φβf(θ)
[r + δ + f(θ)ζβ]2
· ∂ζ
∂φ
+p(θ)ψ
(1− φ)
[α2]2
· f(θ)(1− β)∂ζ
∂φ
.
The first three terms of this expression are positive, while the fourth term is negative.
Nonetheless, since β ≥ 0.5, φ > 1− φ and α2 > r+ δ+ f(θ)ζβ the last term is smaller
in absolute value than the third term. Hence, the overall expression for ∂VN/∂φ is
positive. The latter implies that the locus VN = 0 is upward sloping, since ∂VN/∂θ < 0.
Consequently, the two free entry loci can intersect at most once.¥
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Appendix C: Figures and tables
Table 1: Labour market outcomes in the benchmark model
Variables With OTJ search W/o OTJ search
(λ = 1) (λ = 0)
labour market tightness θ 1.486 1.528
share of unskilled vacancies ζ 0.671 0.891
share of less-educated unemployed φ 0.806 0.770
share of unemployed job seekers ψ 0.765 1
unemployment rate u 0.101 0.081
mass of mismatched workers e(n, h) 0.031 0.206
unemployment rate high-educated workers eu(h) 0.076 0.075
unemployment rate less-educated workers eu(l) 0.109 0.083
wage of less-educated workers w(n, l) 0.905 0.920
wage of high-educated workers in unskilled jobs w(n, h) 0.750 0.955
wage of high-educated worker in skilled job w(s, h) 1.310 1.210
JTJ/ total separations 0.349 0
Wage Inequality
between groups 1.359 1.065
within groups 1.640 1.026
Variance of Wages
total 0.033 0.002
high-educated workers 0.039 0.006
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Table 2: Comparative statics
SBTC SUa
Variables OTJ W/o OTJ OTJ W/o OTJ
labour market tightness θ 1.762 1.786 1.657 1.672
share of high-educated job seekers 1− φψ 0.321 0.287 0.494 0.208
unemployment rate high-educated workers eu(h) 0.070 0.144 0.072 0.120
unemployment rate less-educated workers eu(l) 0.112 0.119 0.136 0.152
JTJ/total separations 0.335 0 0.300 0
Wage inequality
between groups 1.854 1.944 1.484 1.534
within groups 2.317 0 1.923 0
(a) The reported figures correspond to the unique equilibrium with ex-post segmentation.
Table 3: The US vs. Europe
Variables Economy I (EU) Economy II (US)
f(θ) =
√
θ & λ = 0.5 f(θ) = 1.25
√
θ & λ = 1
labour market tightness θ 1.511 1.570
share of high-educated job seekers 1− φψ 0.462 0.377
unemployment rate high-educated workers eu(h) 0.075 0.060
unemployment rate less-educated workers eu(l) 0.108 0.088
JTJ/total separations 0.309 0.308
Wage Inequality
Between groups 1.342 1.400
Within groups 1.377 1.716
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V(s)=0
V(n)=0
θ
φ
θ1
φ1
Figure 1: The unique cross-skill matching equilibrium
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V(n)=0
θ
φ
θ1 θ2
φ2
φ1
Fig. 2: The effects of skill-biased technological change
V(s)=0
V(n)=0
θ
φ
θ1 θ2
φ1
φ2
Fig. 3: The effects of skill-upgrading
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Fig. 4: The equilibrium wages with unequal contact rates
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